debitage

2.12.06

Utilitarianism and The Lesser of Two Evils

Vegankid has a post arguing that if veganism is a philosophy rather than a lifestyle, then the principles underlying it entail concern for oppressed humans as well. But in the process of making this quite accurate point, she makes some inaccurate comments about utilitarianism. She writes:

Peter Singer, author of Animal Liberation, has been on my shit list for some time now. But now this ethics professor and “founding father of modern animal liberation” is officially on my list of people to be forgotten. In a recent interview, Singer argued that “HIV research would be more useful if it were carried out on brain-damaged humans rather than chimps.” If you are familiar with Singer’s academic work, such a statement will come as no surprise. It is not so much because Singer is a misanthrope (as it would seem at first glance), but because he approaches ethics from a utilitarian standpoint (choosing the lesser of two evils). It is the same reason why Singer recently gave his approval on a new research lab that has been targeted by animal rights organizations for its subjection of monkeys to Parkinson’s Disease.

This provides a good example of why veganism must be based on core principles. Otherwise, false notions of utilitarianism allow us to become ethically bankrupt and veganism means nothing. Once again, veganism becomes relegated to the dinner table and self-congratulatory practices of guilt relief. If, however, veganism is based on a notion of compassion, we could no more sentence a persyn with a mental disability to a life of torture than we could a monkey (and vice versa). In fact, if we are to base our veganism on compassion and non-violence, then the causes of disability rights, workers rights, hell, humyn liberation as a whole becomes an extension of veganism.

First, utilitarianism is not opposed to "core principles," and adhering to a utilitarian justification does not make one's actions "mean nothing." And it certainly doesn't justify treating veganism as a mere exercise in "guilt relief." Utilitarianism is a core principle, a foundational-level basis for ethics. It may be the wrong core principle, but it's clearly in the class of prima facie candidates. And utilitarianism clearly directs us to reach out beyond our personal habits and fight for the disabled, workers, and other oppressed people -- mere personal guilt relief is in fact not very utilitarian. Indeed, utilitarianism does not even conflict with one of vegankid's stated core principles, compassion*. The very basis of utilitarianism is to show compassion for, and attempt to alleviate, the suffering of any being that one can meaningfully have compassion for.

The real issue, I think, is not so much the fundamental basis of utilitarianism, but rather how a utilitarian's compassion is expressed -- the maximizing rule, and the particular conclusions Peter Singer draws. As I see it, the concerns raised by vegankid and other anti-utilitarians who make similar arguments are either positive points about utilitarianism, or failings by Peter Singer.

Vegankid says that utilitarianism requires "choosing the lesser of two evils." This is true, and it's a good thing. Utilitarianism says that when the only possible outcomes are evil, and one's actions can affect which will happen, we are obligated to favor the lesser evil. The alternative is to invoke the act-omission distinction and attempt (insofar as it's actually possible) not to influence the decision one way or another. This alternative is more expressive of compassion, in that a person choosing it makes a show of his or her compassion by refusing to actively endorse any evil. However, I think choosing the lesser of two evils is actually the more compassionate act, because it by definition leads to the least suffering possible. The act-omission distinction, on the other hand, puts a premium on self-righteousness -- "I'm not responsible for that evil."

That being said, there's a serious problem with people who take a utilitarian outlook thinking that our choice is between two evils when it's not. In philosophical thought experiements, your menu of options is given by the premises of the question. But real life is far more complex. There is a lot more room than people realize for finding creative non-evil options. However, a willingness to accept the lesser of two evils when necessary can sometimes turn into a lack of motivation to seek additional non-evil possibilities.

Indeed, some people -- Peter Singer included -- go from being willing to choose the lesser evil to being happy about choosing the lesser evil. While excessive self-flagellation is unproductive, we can never forget that the lesser of two evils is still evil, and still produces suffering, which is a bad thing despite its unavoidability. Someone who is too blase about choosing the lesser evil communicates -- to her- or himself as well as to the victim and bystanders -- a lack of compassion for the choice's evil. It is thus incompatible with the utilitarian directive to show full and equal compassion for all.

At times Singer seems to go even further, seeking out and obessing over "lesser of two evil" situations rather than cases where there's a good option. He especially likes cases where -- as vegankid points out about the testing on a monkey versus a human -- one choice is at best only very marginally less evil than the other. This isn't an entirely surprising trait to find in a philosophy professor, but it's not an admirable one to have in public life. There is so much needless oppression in the world that social justice movements won't have to worry over the hard choices for quite some time.

*Her other princple, nonviolence, is not so easily meshed with utilitarianism -- while I think a good utilitarian would oppose violence in nearly all cases, that conclusion is partially dependent on empirical facts and thus there could be situations in which utilitarianism would entail accepting violence.

Stentor Danielson, 11:45, |

1.12.06

Beetles and Fire

This would be very interesting if it's true (I haven't had a chance to look at the actual study yet), since it runs so much against the conventional wisdom:

Study: Beetles may reduce wildfire risk

The infestation of tree-killing bugs sweeping through millions of acres of forests in the West might help prevent wildfires rather than fuel them as feared, according to a new study.

The outbreak of beetles that burrow under the bark, eventually killing the tree, might reduce wildfire risk by naturally thinning forests, according to the report released Tuesday by researchers from Colorado State University, the University of Colorado and the University of Idaho.

But I really hope the AP's contrarian viewpoint is taken out of context, because it's so ridiculous:

Wayne Shepperd is a silviculturist, an expert in the care and development of forests, with the Forest Service's Rocky Mountain Research Station in Fort Collins. He said he disagrees with the report's thrust, calling it "selective science."

"This tends to support the no-management alternative," he said. "I would submit there are valid situations where well-planned management can maintain the forests how we want."

Not having read the actual study yet, I can't vouch for the policy implications that the authors claim. But no responsible interpretation of the report's conclusions would hold that it supports a blanket hands-off policy. Indeed, I've yet to meet anyone knowledgeable about fire who would disagree with Shepperd's last sentence. The question that this study speaks to is when, how, and for what purpose we implement "well-planned management."

It is true that revising our view of the effects of beetle infestations would remove a major argument in the arsenal of the extreme hands-on management faction that promotes large-scale logging in the name of fire safety. Perhaps that's the real issue -- those with a commitment to logging find it in their interest to create a false dichotomy between hands-on and hands-off management, obscuring the fact that there is a great range (qualitatively and quantitatively) of hands-on policies.

Stentor Danielson, 02:38, |

Population, Resources, and David Harvey

I recently reread David Harvey's essay "Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science," which discusses the population-and-resources theories of Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. I remembered liking it the first time I read it several years ago, and I've had a number of Marxist geographers refer to it as one of the great examples of Marxist geography. I'll credit it with being more accessible than some of Harvey's other work. And I suppose I should take into consideration that it was written way back in 1974. But I was still not very impressed.

Harvey's thesis is that political ideologies determine choice of research methodologies, which in turn predetermine the outcome of the research -- outcomes which then give seemingly impartial justification for the original political ideology. So Malthus (a defender of the landed classes) and Ricardo (an apologist for capitalism) were led to choose, respectively, the hypothetico-deductive and abstract modeling approaches, which led them to conclude that population would inevitably outstrip resources and plunge the masses into poverty. On the other hand, the socialist Marx was able to use the methodology of dialectics to see that population pressure on resources is not a universal, but rather is created by the way capitalism shapes people's wants. Modern neo-Malthusian environmentalists (such as the authors of The Limits to Growth) use updated versions of the hypothetico-deductive and abstract modeling methodologies, so it's no surprise that they come to Malthusian conclusions. Unfortunately, despite environmentalists' sincerity of concern, such conclusions are useful for the capitalist system -- and so should be abandoned in favor of Marx's dialectical analysis (as was done, he says, in China under Mao).

Harvey shows that each of the three men have the stated combination of political ideology, research methodology, and conclusions. But he does little to show that there is a necessary relation between them -- that a hypothetico-deductive approach will inevitably conclude that population is outstripping resources, for example. And in fact the history of the Limits to Growth debate show quite clearly that Harvey's thesis is wrong -- because it has no place for cornucopians like Julian Simon. Cornucopians make good use of Ricardo-style abstract economic models to show that the free market will stave off a population crisis, and bring prosperity to everyone, through new technologies and resource substitution. They also look to hypothetico-deductive procedures for support, most famously in Simon's (successful) bet with Limits-to-Growth-er Paul Ehrlich over the prices of various minerals. Indeed, the interesting thing here is that Ricardo and Simon could come to such diametrically opposed conclusions about population, resources, and the welfare of the masses, yet each see their conclusions as justifications for capitalism. The ability to get the political conclusions you want transcends any dependence on research methodology.

So what is Harvey's (and Marx's) big conclusion as to why the Limits to Growth thesis is wrong? He says that population pressure on resources could be solved not only by reducing population, but also by changing the per capita consumption level, or developing new technologies and social systems that expand our resource base and allow us to use it more efficiently. This is quite true -- but it's hardly a radical reframing of the issue. And we didn't need a Marxist to point it out. "Consume less" is the standard environmentalist line (indeed, today Malthusian scenarios are usually invoked to prove the need for lower consumption rather than lower birthrates). And "find new technologies" is the standard moderate and anti-environmentalist line. Either dialectical thinking is unnecessary for reaching Harvey's conclusions, or dialectics is far more commonplace than any of the radical academics extolling its subversive virtues would be willing to admit.

I think that this is symptomatic of a lot of "radical" research. Conclusions that are really fairly straightforward are dressed up in language implying the need for a radical philosophical change in order to be able to see the issue. But if even I can understand -- and agree with -- your conclusions, then they don't depend on "dialetics" or a "relational ontology."

Stentor Danielson, 00:51, |

26.11.06

The Risks of the Unknown and Bestiality Necrophilia

While I'm on the subject of defending sexual practices that most people assume are bad, Pam Spaulding raises the case of a man who's trying to dodge a conviction for cruelty to animals by arguing that the deer he had sex with was dead, and therefore unable to suffer from his attentions. Spaulding is mostly interested in using this case as more anecdotal evidence that people from conservative regions are sick freaks, but numerous people in the comments point out that the guy does actually have a point. I don't see how it's "legal gymnastics" to think that animal cruelty laws are meant to protect the animal, and that since a dead animal can't be harmed, this isn't a crime.

In the comments, NYMOM brings out the Kantian argument against animal cruelty -- it's not the wellbeing of the animal that's at issue, it's that animal abuse causes future human abuse. This case is interesting because the Kantian argument is generally taken to be more modest than animal-welfare-based arguments. Yet (if we accept NYMOM's premise that whether the animal is living or dead doesn't matter in terms of encouraging future crimes against humans) here a Kantian would prohibit something that an animal welfarist would not*.

A bit further on, Samantha Vimes takes the Kantian argument a step further by coupling it with the precautionary principle:

I do think this guy needs psychiatric evaluation. He is killing for sexual gratification, although his victims are animals. As others have pointed out, we can’t be sure if this is *just* bestiality or if he may be inclined to move to human victims. When someone is that far out of normal behavior and combining sex and violence, even if he technically has done only misdemeanors (indecent exposure, for instance), expert opinion is a necessity.

I think this sort of precautionary response may underly a lot of "ick factor" objection to various behaviors. It's a variant on the "this particular order or chaos" viewpoint. Someone who commits a very strange act is an unknown quantity -- we don't know what makes them tick, because their brain certainly doesn't work the way normal people's -- including normal criminals' -- do. Such a person is thus seen as presenting a great risk, because we don't know what else they might do. Note, too, that our reportoire for understanding what actions might lead to other actions is extremely culturally-bound -- there's no logical reason why having sex with an animal corpse could lead to all sorts of chaos whereas eating an animal corpse is normal and predictable**, it's just that the latter is familiar in our culture. So we're inclined to take precautionary action, ranging from avoidance to social condemnation to criminalization or hospitalization. We don't trust that this guy is an otherwise law-abiding man who just happens to have a strong fetish for bestiality necrophilia.

*The welfarist may have a stronger objection to killing the animal in the first place, but we're talking about what happens once it's dead.
**Consider, as a contrast, our fairly similar reactions to doing those two things to a human corpse, or to a vegetable corpse.

Stentor Danielson, 17:18, |